

"Ethnic paradox of modernity" and the liberal civil nation in the horizon of globalization: "challenge" and "response"

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Abstract. The "ethnic paradox of modernity", the explosive growth of fundamentalist nationalist ideologies and extremist nationalist political movements are increasingly regarded as a challenge to the modern global political order - the need for an adequate "response" to this "challenge" is recognized. The dominant economic paradigm in liberal social science (J. Agamben), which presents the reality of the global order, sets a perspective: the answer must demonstrate loyalty to the foundations of "liberal metaphysics", and at the same time confirm their validity in the changed constellation of socio-historical circumstances. On the basis of a free public discussion (rational communicative action) and through the available institutions, on the basis of a liberal "value consensus" that is not subject to revision, a constant search for balances (K. Schmitt) regarding the interests through legal political compromises (F.R. Ankersmit) designed to remove the antagonisms of "national conflicts" shall be conducted. Revealing the conditions for the possibility and boundaries of the liberal strategy of removing antagonisms presupposes the interpretation of the concept of a civil nation, the political project of which is seen as a response to the challenge of "nationalist fundamentalism".

1 Introduction

At the end of the twentieth century, globalization, unexpectedly for the majority of liberal researchers, faced an obstacle that was supposed to have been *removed* long ago, at least for those countries that were considered "civilized". The rapid growth of national identity and the influence of nationalist movements, expressed, moreover, in "unacceptable forms", and manifested itself not only on the periphery of the emerging global order, but even in its *core*, challenging the seemingly effective liberal institutions of "reconciliation of interests" and *legal progress towards compromises based on public discussion*, demanded a *response*. For the disciplinarily arranged modern European science, the said meant the actualization of two main problems. First, it was necessary to once again substantiate the *validity of the foundations of the liberal political order*, presented in the undividedly dominant economic paradigm; K Schmitt [1] called them "dogmas of liberal metaphysics", the most important of

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which he considered *economism*, that is, the resolution of everything political in the *balance of interests*, and *endless public discussion*, that is, rejection of "truth" and transition to "organization of truth" (F.R. Ankersmit [2]), - "economic monocausality", restrained by "politicization" (W. Beck [3]), and being the *principle of the global liberal order*, had to be re-*presented* in an "acceptable" form, but without prejudice to its *obvious reality*. Secondly, the *civic nation* project were to upgrade, taking into account the call by "suddenly emerged" nationalism: according Altermatt, for example, with which the new conditions *are forced to accept* including those researchers who, in full accordance with the dogma of "liberal metaphysics", considered nationalism to be an *essentially* "overcome survivor" ("remnant", in the terminology of V. Pareto [4]), the contradiction between the processes of globalization and the response of nationalism has gone so far that it can be defined as a contradiction between the modern world and jihad, and "both the market economy and nationalism fear civil society and deny democratic institutions and civil rights" [5]. Therefore, the subject of our study is the *ability and method of* "liberal response" to the challenge that the reality of nationalism presents for globalization, the evidence/objectivity of which in the liberal version of the economic paradigm is an axiom that cannot be *revised*.

2 Study Methods

Scientific study is of *subject nature*; disciplinary arranged science thematizes the object of its study as *present*, that is *presented*; *the reality* in which the object is found is *given*, that is, *provided by the paradigm*. Nationalism is thus presented as an object of study in disciplinary arranged science by the dominant liberal "economic paradigm". We focus on the methodological position defined by M. Heidegger: "Any science as such, that is, as science as it is, remains inaccessible to its basic concepts and what they absorb; this is due to the fact that no science can say anything about itself with the help of its own scientific means" [6], - the question of the *foundations* is thus beyond the possibilities of *scientific* study (the choice of a paradigm is a *solution*, M. Weber formulated it in this way: the question of the goal is outside the scientific competence, but there is a political solution). The philosophical interpretation of meaning is the way through which an *understanding of the paradigm* can be achieved. Paradigmatic (that is, philosophical, according to K. Schmitt [7], metaphysical) concepts *combine the real and the actual*; in the *perspective of the paradigm*, as a systematic unity of "metaphysical concepts"/foundations, a rational, that is, scientific *explanation* becomes possible. Therefore, the political project of the "civil nation" presupposes, first of all, a *philosophical interpretation* in the horizon of the economic paradigm as a prerequisite for scientific explanation (identifying its "area of significance" in sociological, political science and, above them and defining them, economic discourses) and practical political activity aimed at formation/construction of the *reality of the "civil nation"*.

3 Study Results

One of the foundations of liberal metaphysics is individualism, which acts not only as a methodological principle, but precisely as a foundation (principle); Calhoun, for example, writes: "From the perspective of the modern West, individuals exist in and of themselves: neither networks of relationships nor overarching hierarchy are the primary source of identity. This modern idea of the individual as a locus of indecomposable identity - at least potentially self-sufficient, independent and self-developing ..." [8]. In support of the named "point of view", they usually refer to the concept of the Kantian autonomous subject, the liberal interpretation of which is assumed to be both true and adequate; a discussion of the validity of such an assumption goes beyond the scope of the tasks that are solved in this

article, but the conclusions are of direct importance for the study of the subject of study. Reasonableness is a distinctive property of such a subject, common to all, but inherent in each to a different degree (Kant singled out minors, the weak-minded and those whose will "self-determined to evil"); the differences between the subjects are accidental, that is, accidental in relation to the named "differential feature". Reasonableness means the freedom of self-determination of an autonomous subject, which is *fundamental* in relation to any definitions conditioned by the circumstances of place and time; a set of "features" shall be the result of a free choice and any "coercive definitions from outside" are illegal and shall be excluded, - one of the most often proclaimed principles of liberal politics, justifying another statement: a society that unites reasonable in this respect (only in this) not only equal, but also identical subjects precisely as reasonable (in all other respects freely differing from each other), shall be thought of as, firstly, the result of the free choice of autonomous subjects and, secondly, whose freedom is limited by the freedom of everyone; this is all the more true for *any communities* that make up this *political community*. "Features" are presented without substance, that is, as *interests*; politics is the management of interests to achieve a balance between them, that is - the policy of *compromises* (F.R. Ankersmit [2]). In principle, there are no features that could not be presented as interests and between which it would be impossible to find a *balance* through free public discussion; a liberal society has institutions that are effective in managing interests and achieving balances.

However, due to historical circumstances, some "peculiarities", including national ones, are still not *resolved* in the interests and are presented "substantively". E. Gelner [9], for example, in his work on formation of European nations, offers a sociological analysis of why nations can be attributed to "substantiality"; its explanation is quite "liberal": a consistent and principled reduction to competing economic interests sometimes does not exclude, and the further we are from the present, the more often, the "epiphenomenal effect" of the "substantialization of the national"; by the way, Bauman in his work "Globalization. Consequences for Man and Society" [10] asserts that globalization only enhances this "effect" so much that it becomes a "challenge", not to globalization as such, but to the way of its implementation by the dominant actors acting "on behalf of" the "economic monocausality". "Features" can mutually reinforce each other; when nationality, religion and culture "unite", then what is now called fundamentalism arises. It is fundamentalism (nationalist ideology, religious fundamentalism, which often form a unity), and not nationality as such, that is regarded as a challenge to the modern liberal order.

The search for an answer to the challenge of "nationalist fundamentalism" is carried out in two main directions, depending on whether it is regarded as a consequence of the "self-determination of the will to evil" (then it *is called* terrorism), or as a consequence of a "mistake" due to "historical minority" or a unique historical constellation of circumstances that caused the "effect of nationalism". At the heart of the distinction is a *decision*, the conditioning of which is the subject of *philosophical interpretation*. The defining context here is the reality presented in the liberal version of the economic paradigm and, what is *essential*, the decision must remain *true to the* foundations of liberal metaphysics. Omitting the history of the economic paradigm (set out by J. Agamben [11]), we must single out one of its essential definitions: reality presented in this way is universal, homogeneous, total; its rational order is unified - the political task is viewed as correcting the emerging "disorder", that is, deviations from the "rational order", that is, *management*. In such a reality *there are no boundaries* - there is a *frontier*, "hotbeds of unreason" (for example, the "national ghettos" of Z. Bauman [10]) and - "external darkness" (we have the right to use this expression not as a metaphor: recognition of the possibility of "self-determination to evil" provides a basis for this), which "breaks through" the boundaries of a reasonable order (like terrorism). Therefore, the content of the decision to be taken is concretized: the criterion is the possibility of assimilation into a universal and homogeneous rational world order (moreover, what was

said about a free autonomous individual is also a *principle of* this order: the principles of the economic paradigm and the foundations of liberal metaphysics are presented here as *one*).

However, this is only one side of the issue; it is fundamentally that such an order is presented as *valid*, and areas and places "challenging" are regarded as *criminals* (terrorists: [12], intending to destroy it. Finally, since the reality of this rational world order is *implemented* precisely and only where liberal principles prevail and an agreement ("basic consensus") has been reached on the rules of its structure, presented as *values*, then this "core" is assumed to be a "model" (from which, incidentally, in the positive sciences M. Weber warned, distinguishing between the "ideal type" and "ideal", that is, taking the question of the *reality of the* "ideal" beyond the boundaries of scientific study) and the "place of legal decision" regarding the various "periphery". So, homogeneity, the invalidity of borders, the impossibility of distinguishing between internal and external (which the war theoreticians have been persistently pointing out for the past twenty years, albeit in a different context), universality, "the highest value" and fairness of the policy aimed at correcting "irrationalities" and even more so on "elimination of crimes" is the context in which a decision is made to distinguish between "delusion" from "crime" related to *nationality*. The above can be summarized as follows: presented as valid in the economic paradigm of the political liberal order ensures *its security*, making a decision on separation; proceeding from its exceptional rationality, it pursues a policy of *implementing the justice*, the measure of which is loyalty to liberal values and the ability to validate them.

The most consistent and principled liberal response to the challenge of the growth of nationalism is D. Lal's offer [13] to distinguish and maintain the distinction in the policy pursued between "material" and "cosmological" values. The first, actually liberal (freedom of the market, openness, economic freedom of actors), are declared universal and a new global order is built on them. Second: national traditions, religious beliefs, cultural characteristics, even a specific understanding of "human rights" - to the extent that they are a *private* matter - are not political concerns of global power, but only as long as they do not become an "obstacle" to universal and total "monocausal logic of capital". If, however, "cosmological values" come into real conflict with "material values" and become an obstacle to formation of a global liberal order, they shall be "eliminated", and by any available means.

In connection with the above, liberal theorists also believe (J. Rawls [14], F.R. Ankersmit [2]) that a free political discussion (now more often with reference to the political meaning of "communicative action" by Yu. Habermas [15; 16] leads to "overlapping consensus" (Rawls) as an ongoing process of "reconciliation of interests" (that is, "organizing the truth") in a series of political compromises. The condition for this is the *presence of a* "basic consensus" on liberal principles, which are not subject to compromise and which must be protected by the "power of institutions" (numerous interpretations "adapt" Rawls' concept to the specific modern conditions of the "loss of evidence" of the named consensus [17; 18]. Finally, the "monocausal logic of capital" can be limited by means of "politicization" (W. Beck [3]) to soften and make acceptable the emergence of a global order, the movement towards which is "objective" and "irrevocable". The condition for all of the listed ways of responding to the challenge of "nationalism" is to present it as *ultimately* conditioned by dissatisfied and unaccounted for *interests*. The result of politics as governance and the alignment of interests is a *civic nation* as an *association* based on a "basic consensus" regarding the liberal values of freely self-determined individuals. The "palliative" ability to interpret fundamentalism as a *ressentiment* (S. Zizek [19]) is also implemented, that is, as a consequence of the inability to implement the "Western model" *already adopted* as an *ideal*.

Regarding the issue, what after Kant, is called "self-determination to evil", another answer is supposed to be possible: "anti-terrorist war" operation which, globally and universally, appears to be fair, internal and essentially endless, that is, a "police operation" (its special analysis is not included in the subject of this study: [20])

Therefore, “civil nation” and “anti-terrorist war” are the two-pronged liberal response to the challenge of modern nationalism; the structure of this two-pronged concept must also be identified and interpreted, but only in the aspect of interpreting the liberal *political project of a civil nation*.

4 Discussion of Results

Despite the complete “surprise” for liberal social science of what has come to be known as the “ethnic paradox of modernity” [21], the assertion that the “national” determines modernity is not new, but has been confirmed in connection with the “challenge” presented by modern nationalist movements and ideologies: the idea of nationalism is "a constituent element of modernity" [22], nationalism "determines modernity, and is not determined by it" [22]; nationalism is a "powerful" ideology that has become "prevalent" in Europe and then throughout the world [23]; modernity is the "era of nationalism" [9]; "the triumph of nationalism in the modern world" [24]; “nationalism is a phenomenon that accompanies modernization, which is experienced by every society on the way to modernity” [5] and “ethno-nationalism”, for example, under the name “ethnopluralism” is an essential element of modern “right-wing ideologies”, and it “is gaining an ever-increasing influence in society” [5].

The civil nation, thus, being a liberal response to the "ethnic paradox of modernity", acts as a metaphysical concept, despite the fact that liberalism consistently denies any "metaphysics" - this determines the *way of presenting* and *substantiating* this concept. The civil nation is presented as a reality, that is, as a necessary element of the economic paradigm of presenting reality. Sociological, political science and historical studies of the reality of a civil nation are in the exact sense "historiographic recalculation of the past" (M. Heidegger) *from the present*, - therefore, *discrepancies* in the description of *its beginning* (the nineteenth century by E. Gelner [9] and M. Mann [25] or the 17th century - by L. Grinfeld [22]) are not of fundamental importance and depend on the belonging of the discourse to the corresponding scientific discipline [26; 27]; it is essential that it is an element of the economic paradigm.

The content of the concept of a civil nation is built on the horizon of the imperatives of liberal metaphysics; it is most fully presented in the work of L. Grinfeld “Nationalism. Five paths to Modernity” [22]. She describes a civil nation like this. “The original national idea arose in English society in the 16th century, which became the first nation in the world. The British remained the only nation for nearly two hundred years (with the possible exception of the people of Holland). The individualistic civic nationalism that developed in England was inherited by the English colonies in America and became the hallmark of the United States” [22]. Its essence is described as follows: "a sense of respect for the individual and especially respect for the personal dignity of a person" [22]; “the principle of personal freedom and political equality” [22]; "freedom together with equality and reason formed the very basis of the English nationality" [22]; politically, this meant “an insistent demand that the people have the right to participate in the political process and governing the country through parliament” [22], that is, “the right to political citizenship” [22]; socially - "a tendency to equalize the conditions of existence of different social strata" [22]; the most important thing is "fundamental individualism, the obligation to defend one's own individual rights and the rights of the individual of others" [22]; especially in the case of England, “nationality elevated each member of the community, which this nationality endowed with sovereignty (supreme power). National identity is essentially a matter of personal dignity"[22] and "while everywhere the exaltation of the nation has become the exaltation of oneself, in the case of England it has become the exaltation of oneself as a human being - a

free rational individual - and therefore the exaltation of human dignity, of humanity as a whole" [22].

Therefore, the content and purpose of the *political project of a civil nation* is determined, which, according to Greenfeld in the same book, *can be thought of as a world nation* (for example, as an "information nation" [28], that is, we are dealing with a "metaphysical concept" inscribed in the global liberal order.

The reality of a world civil nation is *becoming*, and not all *existing* nations will "become part" of a world liberal civil nation. Some that are called "ethnic" must either be "reformed" or "disappear". In 1944 G. Cohn "made an important distinction between the "voluntaristic" type of nationalism, which considers the nation a free association of reasonable people, consisting of individuals who enter it of their own free will, and the "organic" type, which considers the nation as an organism with an unchanging and indelible character, which its members endowed at birth and from which they can never get rid of" [29]; Kohn "also owns the assertion that the first type is characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon world, while the second type of ideology is typical for nationalist movements east of the Rhine" [29]. It is clear to sociologists (for example, Brubaker [30]) that such a distinction "has no empirical basis," but shall be retained as "regulatory".

The way to transform an ethnic nation into a civil one is to change the idea of national identity; R. Brubaker's constructivist theory describes the *process* ("downscaling", "depoliticization" of representation through "private interests") [31] of such a transformation, - existing nations are "ranked" according to the criterion of their ability to make such transformations; programs are being put forward designed as for European ones (for example, W. Altermat [5]), and on the "peripheral" areas of "activation of nationalism". One of the ways *to remove the national conflict* is considered to transfer it to the "ethical plane" (B. Yak [24]) with the subsequent moral disqualification of "national fundamentalism", which also entails "legal consequences" [32]. "Objective obstacles" on the way to the formation of a civil nation are not completely ignored either; for example, K. Huebner [33] asserts about civic loyalty as a motive for national self-identification: "The idea of the philosophers of the modern Enlightenment, according to which, in the final analysis, it is the state system of their country that is the source of loyalty to it (constitutional patriotism) is absolutely alien to reality" [33]; national identity shall be based on "feeling" [34]. However, this is only a "private remark", especially since Huebner himself, in the book cited, substantiates the concept of a nation, in which the *rationality of civic loyalty* is supported "mythically": the "myth of the nation" *can* be in agreement with the liberal concept, as Huebner showed. This perspective examines, for example, "liberal nationalism" [35], opposed to "populist nationalism" [36], compares multiculturalism and nationalism as models of belonging to a diverse political community [37].

Ultimately, the evidence of a *metaphysical concept* is *mythical evidence*; therefore, the question discussed in the article, finally, can, as a result of the philosophical interpretation, be posed: is liberal metaphysics capable of giving *birth to a myth*, and is it possible for reality presented in the economic paradigm to *accommodate it*.

5 Conclusions

The reality of a civic nation and the success of its political project are conditioned by a *decision* that posits the economic paradigm to *represent reality*; it is this decision that is challenged by the challenge from "fundamentalist nationalism" and makes the question of its *foundation actual*. Such a question *cannot be posed* "from within" the paradigm, which is the *horizon of the obvious* and the prospect for the *answers* that the "positive sciences" are concerned with finding; this is a matter for philosophical interpretation. The new European subject, described by Heidegger as primarily concerned with ensuring guarantees of its

security, and modernity as the “final period of modern times”, endlessly lasting *outside history* and *without meaning*, guarantees its *existence* with a security policy (“risk management”) based on a liberal response to the challenge “National fundamentalism”. In this, but only in this respect, the liberal project of the civil nation can be considered satisfactory.

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