

# Kant's anthropology and political realism

Andrey S. Zilber<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, *Academia Kantiana*, 14 Aleksandra Nevskogo st., 236016 Kaliningrad, Russia

**Abstract.** An upholder of liberal political values, Kant opposed the tradition of political realism on several levels, one of them the anthropological foundations of politics. Kant's position was moderate: like liberals, he believed in the evolution of freedom; like conservatives, he underscored the difficulties confronting a person on that way and dissuaded from taking hasty action. Realists deem these difficulties either insurmountable or surmountable to such a modest degree that they will not allow the overcoming of anarchy, uncertainty and the conflict-prone nature of international relations. Some of Kant's contemporaries criticised his philosophy of politics and law from positions close to political realism and conservatism in the broadest sense. I analyse and compare the arguments on both sides of this controversy. Kant pictured "practical politicians" who point out the weakness of human nature to justify the wilfulness of rulers' breach of agreements whilst denying the need for liberal reforms. I demonstrate that the obscurantist and pessimistic views of "practising politicians", described by Kant, are very close to the arguments put forward by Friedrich von Gentz and August Wilhelm Rehberg, who had openly criticised Kant's idea that political practice should be orientated towards an abstract theory and optimistic assumptions. Thus Kant responded to their criticism implicitly. Yet, both parties to the debate are universalists: Kant, on the one hand, with his concept of respect for right common to all people, and realists, on the other, with their idea of the moral weakness of humans.

**Keywords:** political realism, conservatism, anthropological pessimism, ethical naturalism, Kant, Gentz, Rehberg

## 1 Introduction

Kant's political philosophy is, on the one hand, a variety of political idealism since it is orientated towards the concept of rational law and sets abstract normative criteria for evaluating the current situation. On the other hand, it can be described as realistic since Kant takes full account of the problems of realising political ideals – problems stemming from the complexity of human nature. Looking for a balance and a path from reality to ideals, Kant stands up for the teachings that are biased towards one or another. For example, a marked skew towards reality is characteristic of realism as a school of political thought.

---

\* Corresponding author: [AZilber@kantiana.ru](mailto:AZilber@kantiana.ru)

ORCID: 0000-0002-8317-4086

The realists of the early modern period often supported absolute monarchy, an estate-based society and unlimited sovereignty of states. That is why realists are often referred to as conservatives. The 1790s witnessed a heated debate on the prospects and legitimacy of the order the French revolutionaries attempted to establish. Kant occupied a moderate position here, arguing in favour of a republican form of government and the associated rights of citizens and against overthrowing the government in place. Several months later, the same journal published responses from public officials, Friedrich von Gentz (1793) and August Wilhelm Rehberg (1794). They questioned the practical applicability of Kant's theory and any political theory based on the concepts of duty and the principles of morals. They effectively represented political realism, proclaiming a divorce between politics and morals, as well as underscoring that morality had no place in politics.

I will begin by analysing Kant's views on the issue and summarising the positions he deemed unacceptable. I will also revisit the role the criticism of these positions has in Kant's political philosophy in general. I will then examine Gentz's and Rehberg's arguments in the light of their influence on Kant's judgements, whilst evaluating the role of their objections to Kant in the development of political realism in the early modern period.

## **2 Kant on the anthropological foundations of political strategies**

Kant saw the purpose of the political and legal organisation of society in achieving a balance between freedom and restrictions of it since humans are rational beings, albeit susceptible to selfish inclinations (*IaG*, AA 08: 22-23; Kant, 1784a, pp. 8-9). He viewed domestic policy of states as inextricably linked to their foreign policies. As to international politics, he partly accepted the principles behind the Peace of Westphalia made in the seventeenth century, particularly the sovereignty of states, the equal legal status of nations and strict compliance with international treaties. He called for a more rigorous adherence to these principles than had been common in the eighteenth century. This very combination of principles ultimately became characteristic of political realism as a school of thought in international relations, the only difference being that realists believe that some states hold a privileged position by right (Donnelly, 2005, p. 35). For Kant, this idea was inadmissible: he argued for the equality of states (*ZeF*, AA 08: 384; Kant, 1795, p. 107). Another object of his criticism was the aspiration to ensure the security of states by creating a balance of power between them – an idea ingrained after the Peace of Westphalia. He pointed to the fragility of this balance and that the underside of striving for it is constant distrust of other states or the continuous build-up of military and economic might in agreement with the personal ambitions of rulers to increase their power (*ZeF*, AA 08: 354, 357; Kant, 1795, pp. 78, 81).

As to domestic politics pursued by absolute monarchies, the attempts to increase the power of the state and extend its authority metamorphose easily into conservative measures and suppression of freedom. Kant's reflection on this tendency is closely linked to the criticism of some philosophical principles, which developed and gained popularity in the eighteenth century. One of them is the principle of eudaemonism, which bases virtue on the aspiration to happiness, absolutising thriftiness as a result. As Erikh Solovyov aptly points out, the eighteenth century was "obsessed" with maxims of prudence and petty prescriptions of all kinds (Solovyov, 2005, p. 56). The other central principle is political paternalism (Solovyov, 2005, pp. 140-144). Combined, these principles are fraught with the danger of rulers, who ostensibly seek welfare and happiness, hypocritically inculcating in their subjects (especially those of the lower estates) the idea of dependence and thus depriving them of the freedom that is natural for humans (*WA*, AA 08: 35-36; Kant, 1784b, p. 18). Kant criticises the idea of coercive perfection of the human being, counterpoising it with the idea of moral autonomy.

Equal attention is paid by Kant to criticising the other extreme, which can be formulated as follows: “people are evil in moral terms, and they cannot become any better”. The idea of keeping destructive inclinations at bay and countering them by force or threats is another classical conception of political realism, in the same way as the impossibility of overcoming the natural state of intergovernmental relations (anarchy) is. Realists’ distrust of states is rooted in scepticism towards the moral quality of people in general. According to Kant, practical politicians are convinced that they “know human beings” and believe that one should judge from people’s actions. He emphasises that the conditions for acquiring this knowledge are similar to the practice of law, i.e. trivial litigations, which often bring out the worst in people (*ZeF*, AA 08: 374; Kant, 1795, p. 97). All this is very far from the idea of legislation, which, Kant maintains, should gradually assimilate the *a priori* principles of right and see human beings through the prism of human nature and what can be made out of it, if their best predispositions and inclinations are developed.

Kant writes that the pessimistic conclusions about people must not be extended to the principles of legislation since this would mean ignoring the predisposition to rationality and seeing people as incapable of good, guided exclusively by the “mechanism of nature” – like living machines (*ZeF*, AA 08: 379; Kant, 1795, p. 102). The incapability of good (or aversion to good and justice) means the lack of moral freedom, from which one can conclude that society should be arranged, like a mechanism, in a proper order (most likely, a feudal one, which best suits the interests of the ruling class) – an order established from above and not requiring reform.

Kant believes that both politicians and the general public perfectly understand the injustice of such views. He stresses that suspiciousness of others often coexists with self-conceit (*ZeF*, AA 08: 375; Kant, 1795, p. 98). And he sees the origin of this pattern of thinking in insincerity – the common human inclination to justify illegal actions by “appealing to the weakness of human nature” (*ZeF*, AA 08: 380; Kant, 1795, p. 103). Kant does not deny human weaknesses; he merely speaks of its “frailty” (*fragilitas*; *RGV*, AA 07: 30, Kant, 1793, p. 32). Even the policy of paternalism, he writes, has its roots in the conservative inclination of people to fear political change. This inclination stems from “idleness and cowardice” (*WA*, AA 08: 35; Kant, 1784b, p. 17). But the problem of abuse of moral freedom is solved on the way to Enlightenment, and just politics is conducive to this solution.

So, in his treatise *Toward Perpetual Peace*, Kant draws an absurd and obscurantist picture of the views on human moral nature that contradict his own. These views can be described as empiricism and naturalism with a bias towards anthropological pessimism. Anthropological pessimism is explicitly set out by the forefathers of political realism in the philosophy of the early modern period (Donnelly, 2005, p. 32). Machiavelli advises the prince to presuppose that the negative qualities prevail in humans: “it is much safer to be feared than loved” (Machiavelli, 1532, pp. 93-94). Hobbes’s works are also replete with pessimistic assessments of human nature. He sees the main causes of conflicts in competition, diffidence and glory (Hobbes, 1651, p. 91). Kant, however, mentions Hobbes not in this context but when discussing the idea of the social contract and the responsibility of rulers towards their subjects (*TP*, AA 08, 303; Kant, 1793, p. 57). Machiavelli does not appear in Kant’s works at all. Some contemporary researchers maintain that the models of political rationality derived from recommendations given by Machiavelli and Kant should be considered in “augmentation, not in opposition” (Chaly, 2016).

Thus, one may suppose that Kant’s reflection should be interpreted in the context of the 1790s debate on the legality and prospects of the French Revolution. And this raises the question of what could influence the evolution of Kant’s position after the publication of the treatise *On the Common Saying*, when he was mulling over the ideas presented in *Toward Perpetual Peace*. In the former work, the correlation between theory and practice provided

an abstract context for reflection on the principles of right. In the latter, these two lines of thought are closely intertwined: Kant links theory with morals and political practice with attempts to downplay the significance of morals.

### 3 Gentz and Rehberg: Opponents of Kant and political realists

Gentz and Rehberg, who lodged objections to Kant's political ideas in the winter of 1792/93, were then in the civil service: Gentz in Berlin (Prussia) and Rehberg in Hanover (then a British city). And both were acquainted with Kant. Rehberg was his follower so far as concerns the philosophy of mathematics. However, being a supporter of the estate-based system, he bitterly resented the revolution in France (Beiser, 2020). Gentz met Kant during his study at the University of Königsberg. Initially, he welcomed the revolution from the perspective of Kant's practical philosophy (Henrich, 1967, p. 18). But soon afterwards, in 1792, when war was already a daunting prospect, Gentz translated Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* and irrevocably moved over to the side of the conservatives.

Gentz calls Kant's theses on liberty, equality and autonomy of citizens a "theory of pure state law" and recognises this theory as a norm and a touchstone, considering it, however, mere general "preliminary knowledge" (Gentz, 1793, p. 102). A more comprehensive "theory of state organisation" (*ibid.*, p. 109), which answers questions about the structure of power, its limits and guarantees, could serve as a touchstone in politics. It should, according to Gentz, include knowledge of the character and behaviour of individuals and masses, as well as that of human abilities, inclinations, weaknesses and passions, and this knowledge should be obtained not instantaneously but through continuous observation and comparison of various cases and circumstances and by studying social relations (*ibid.*, p. 103).

Gentz acknowledges the need to perfect the state structure. At the same time, he deems it possible to combine paternalist "father's rule" with the "fatherland" (*ibid.*, pp. 108-109). Later, Kant would write in the same vein about the possibility of a monarchist rule in the spirit of a representative system. But Gentz does not acknowledge the moral foundations of Kant's theory as a touchstone for practice, arguing that politics cannot guarantee the rule of the concept of duty. Nevertheless, he does not put forward any alternative, limiting himself to observations on the weakness of human nature. The impossibility of realising the idea of the social contract at the very moment of the state creation is, for Kant, a remark, a qualification.<sup>1</sup> But, for Gentz, this is a central and independent thesis that is not supplemented with any prospects and hopes for the future (*ibid.*, p. 102). Apprehensive of the simplicity with which people can be deceived, Gentz does not share Kant's hopes for the publicity of politics to become a driver of reform (*ibid.*, pp. 109-110).

Kant and Gentz diverged on the question of the peacefulness of republics. Both noted the connection between the behaviour of states and their internal structure. Kant was not a militarist and regarded it as desirable to avoid wars and ensure that nations displayed restrained and peaceful behaviour. He hoped for peaceful republics because he believed that, in a republic, decisions to wage war were made with public participation or, rather, with that of legislative assemblies of representatives (as the Kantian model of republic suggested). Citizens, according to Kant, oppose war as long as it can be avoided. He wrote about this in 1795 after France, confronted with a conflict situation, had decided to declare war on monarchical Austria instead of trying to settle the matter peacefully. Whilst observing this war, Gentz (1801, p. 214) concluded that democratisation led not to peace but to the decay of morals and thus to bloodier wars. He believed that the longer revolutionary France was at

---

<sup>1</sup> On the discussion of the Kantian idea of the social contract and the general will in the early twentieth century in the light of the correlation between freedom and order, see Zagirnyak (2020).

war, the more able it was to mobilise additional forces to continue military action. And instead of the attrition of military forces, there was a multiplication of them (Gentz, 1800, p. 386). Joachim Krause calls Gentz the creator of democratic warfare theory, which explained much in the politics of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries (Krause, 2013, pp. 18-20). Gentz attributed a decisive role in preserving peace to the *balance of power*. Yet, he acknowledged that one should not pin considerable hopes on this balance, dooming international law to indeterminacy. In his opinion, the inclinations of humans and states were more changeable than nature, and their morality was “a chimney where the wind howls” (Gentz, 1800, p. 384).

As for Rehberg’s objections to Kant, he largely agreed with Gentz as concerns the moral character of the human race. Rehberg (1794, pp. 125-126) wrote that humans were part of nature, subject to physical laws, among which were the psychological laws of affect. Although the ‘wild inclinations’ are kept at bay in a civil state, no human is a complete master of herself or himself. Rehberg (1794, p. 127) saw the basic motive for action as the pursuit of pleasure (and Gentz as the pursuit of bliss) and the foundations of the civil state as the provision of utility. Any theory of the state should be based on experience – in this, too, Gentz and Rehberg agree. Rehberg, however, makes the reservation that one should be guided not by “blind practice”, not instincts and customs per se, but conclusions from the observation and experience of human needs and behaviour in civil relations (*ibid.*).

Taking into account Rehberg’s direct characterisation of the moral nature of human beings, one may conclude that his picture of civil relations is at the interface of the traditions of eudaemonism, ethical naturalism and utilitarianism. Indeed, he argues that a civic order according to *a priori* principles can only be realised in a world of absolutely free beings, whilst in the empirical world this order is largely conditioned by utility and beneficence. This also applies to international relations, in which, he maintains, there are no universal criteria of justice: these criteria cannot be derived directly from moral law, and their determination should be entrusted to the care of rulers (*ibid.*, p. 130). Gentz’s and Rehberg’s articles do not detail how rulers make decisions, but one can safely assume that these particulars would be close to the reflection presented earlier in 1788 by another opponent of Kant’s, Christian Garve, who attempted to wed the experience of history with the Wolffian finalistic principle of state perfection (Stolleis, 1972). Unambiguous conclusions could hardly be reached on this basis. And Kant did emphasise this difficulty, contrasting it with the simplicity of the categorical imperative (Zilber, 2020).

Reidar Maliks calls Gentz and Rehberg “Kant’s conservative critics”, who had an influence on the way the principles of civil freedom and equality were presented in Kant’s 1790s works (Maliks, 2014, pp. 9, 55). This assumption raises the question of the correlation between conservatism and realism. The term “conservatives” is mostly used in the context of domestic policy and “realists” in that of international policy, although this is not a universal rule today and was not one throughout the history of ideas. Realism is relatively cohesive as regards anthropological premises, which are more heterogeneous in conservatism.<sup>2</sup>

I emphasise the line of realism in the arguments of Gentz and Rehberg, who themselves chose this line of thought as the leading one in their responses to Kant, who criticised this very line in the reflection of the two civil servants. As regards realism, the positions of Gentz and Rehberg were quite close, which could not be said about their views in general. Rehberg is known as a critic of revolution, defender of tradition, and exponent of distrust of reason as a source of legal principles; he is “rightly regarded as a founding father of German conservatism” (Beiser, 2020). Moreover, Gentz’s main interest was foreign policy. A response to the French Revolution, conservatism in the narrow sense was still in its infancy

---

<sup>2</sup> This is not an obstacle to describing the universal foundation of conservatism. See, for instance, Chaly (2015).

at the end of the eighteenth century. Conservative Burke put emphasis not so much on the depravity of people as on the distrust of reason and the need to rely on traditions and customs specific to different peoples (Burke, 1790, p. 500). Gentz had little interest in this topic, albeit he was influenced by Burke. In my opinion, Gentz never became part of mainstream conservatism as it was understood in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, Harro Zimmermann called Gentz's views "the invention of realpolitik", i.e. the anticipation of the principles that Ludwig von Rochau formulated in the middle of the nineteenth century and followed, for instance, by Bismarck (Zimmermann, 2012).

## 4 Conclusion

To those who are called today political realists, Kant refers in his treatise on perpetual peace as "practical persons", accusing them of attempts to bend morals in the interests of politicians. In doing so, he wants to expose both the practical strategies and their public justification. With some deliberate exaggeration, Kant depicts the views of "practical persons" as an amalgamation of anthropological pessimism, ethical naturalism and utilitarian ethics, emphasising the negative effect of these views on legislation and politics. Kant seeks to demonstrate that the proponents of these principles and views present a united front and cite weaknesses of human nature to deny the need for liberal reforms. This link between the philosophy of law and moral anthropology is present in Kant from the very beginning (already in the *Idea for a Universal History*). The complex and varied arguments through which this connection is expressed in *Toward Perpetual Peace* are Kant's response to Gentz's and Rehberg's criticism of the treatise *On the Common Saying*. Kant, however, does not mention them by name, polemicising in his reflection against all "practical persons" regarding their views on the moral nature of humans. It is worth noting that both parties to this polemic were universalists: Kant with his unified system of norms and the idea of universal respect for right, on the one hand, and realists with their idea of the moral weakness of humans, on the other.

Up to the present day, political realists in the philosophy of international relations tend to appeal to the restraints of human nature and its worst traits when explaining the limitations of diplomacy, the sources of social conflict and injustice (see Donnelly, 2000, p. 161). They argue that it is unwise to act in accordance with the requirements of morals whilst bad intentions clearly prevail in the world around us. These arguments retain their role in neorealism (structural realism), although some representatives of this school of thought have attempted to present patterns of intergovernmental relations as independent of personal motives (see Brown, 2009).

Krause writes that Kant focused on possibilities that could not become reality until the second half of the twentieth century, whilst Gentz focused on the problems that made Kant's peace project impossible in the late eighteenth century. Although the ways to solve these problems were discussed by other thinkers as early as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these problems persist, and the debate continues. In domestic politics, the discussion centres on the political role of the public sphere of society; in international relations, solutions are sought for the "security dilemma".<sup>3</sup> In this context, Kant's recommendations to avoid the extremes of ethical naturalism, mechanism and anthropological pessimism may still resound today, despite modern empirical and mathematical models of behaviour having come a long way from the teachings on passions and affects, prevalent in the eighteenth century.

---

<sup>3</sup> For example, according to Salikov (2013), Kant's approach can be treated as an equivalent to the liberal, realist, neoliberal, institutional and constructivist approaches.

**Acknowledgements:** This research was supported by the scholarship programme of the Interdisciplinary Center for the Research of the European Enlightenment (IZEA Halle), Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Germany.

## References

- Beiser, F.C., 2020. August Wilhelm Rehberg. In: E.N. Zalta, ed. 2020. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), [online] Available at: <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/august-rehberg/>> (Accessed 23.11.2020).
- Brown, C., 2009. Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature. *International Relations*, 23(2), pp. 257-270.
- Burke, E., 1790. Reflections on the Revolution in France. In: E. Burke, 2015. *Reflections on the Revolution in France and Other Writings*. Ed. by J. Norman. New York: Everyman's Library, pp. 425-646.
- Chaly, V., 2015. Denying Liberty in Order to Make Room for Freedom: Liberalism, Conservatism, and Kantian Philosophy. *Voprosy Filosofii*, 9, pp. 66-78. (In Rus.)
- Chaly, V., 2016. Rationality in Machiavelli and in Kant. *Con-Textos Kantianos*, 4, pp. 89-97.
- Donnelly, J., 2000. *Realism and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Donnelly, J., 2005. Realism. In: S. Burchill *et al.*, ed. 2005. *Theories of International Relations*. Third Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 29-54.
- Gentz, F. von, 1793. Nachtrag zu dem Raisonement des Herrn Professor Kant über das Verhältnis zwischen Theorie und Praxis. In: D. Henrich, ed. 1967. *Kant – Gentz – Rehberg. Über Theorie und Praxis*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 89-111.
- Gentz, F. von, 1800. Über den ewigen Frieden. In: A. Dietze and W. Dietze, eds. 1989. *Ewiger Friede? Dokumente einer deutschen Diskussion um 1800*. Leipzig & Weimar: Kiepenheimer, pp. 377-391.
- Gentz, F. von, 1801. *Über den Ursprung und Charakter des Krieges gegen die Französische Revolution*. In: F. von Gentz, 1997. *Gesammelte Schriften. Volume 1*. Edited by G. Kronenbitter. Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann.
- Henrich, D., 1967. Über den Sinn vernünftigen Handelns im Staat. In: D. Henrich, ed. 1967. *Kant – Gentz – Rehberg. Über Theorie und Praxis*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 7-35.
- Hobbes, T., 1651. *Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*. Ed. by J.J. Popiel, 2004. New York: Barnes & Noble Books.
- Kant, I., 1798. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Translated by R.B. Louden. In: I. Kant, 2007. *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Ed. by G. Zöllner and R.B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 231-429.
- Kant, I., 1784a. Idea for a Universal History from Cosmopolitan Perspective. In: I. Kant, 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. Edited by P. Kleingeld. Translated by D.L. Colclasure. London & New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 3-16.
- Kant, I., 1793a. On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice'. Parts 2 and 3. In: I. Kant, 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. Edited by P. Kleingeld. Translated by D.L. Colclasure. London & New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 44-66.
- Kant, I., 1793b. *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*. Translated by W.S. Pluhar, 2009. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Kant, I., 1795. Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. In: I. Kant, 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. Edited by P. Kleingeld. Translated by D.L. Colclasure. London and New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 67-109.
- Kant, I., 1784b. An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? In: I. Kant, 2006. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*. Edited by P. Kleingeld. Translated by D.L. Colclasure. London and New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 17-23.
- Krause, J., 2013. Kant und seine Zeit – die Schrift „Zum ewigen Frieden“ vor der Hintergrund der Französischen Revolution und der nachfolgenden Kriege. In: A. Zilber and A. Salikov, eds. 2013. *Kant's Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics: Proceedings of International Seminar*. Kaliningrad: IKBFU Press, pp. 9-23.
- Machiavelli, N., 1532. *The Prince*. Translated by R. Goodwin, 2003. Boston: Dante University Press.
- Maliks, R., 2014. Kant's Politics in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rehberg, A.W., 1794. Über das Verhältnis der Theorie zur Praxis In: D. Henrich, ed. 1967. *Kant – Gentz – Rehberg. Über Theorie und Praxis*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 113-130.
- Salikov, A.A., 2013. Kants Friedensprojekt und die Ansätze zur Lösung des Sicherheitsdilemmas in der modernen Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen. In: A. Zilber and A. Salikov, eds. 2013. *Kant's Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics: Proceedings of International Seminar*. Kaliningrad: IKBFU Press, pp. 135-144.
- Stolleis, M., 1972. *Staatsräson, Recht und Moral im philosophischen Texten des späten 18. Jahrhunderts*. Meisenheim am Glan: Hein.
- Solovyov, E.Yu., 2005. *Kategoricheskii imperativ npravstvennosti i prava [Categorical Imperative of Morality and Law]*. Moscow: Progress-Traditsiya. (In Rus.)
- Zagirnyak, M.Yu., 2020. Georges Gurvitch and Sergey Hessen on the Possibility of Forming Social Unity. *Kantian Journal*, 39(3), pp. 72-96. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2020-3-4>
- Zilber, A.S., 2020. Inadvisable Concession: Kant's Critique of the Political Philosophy of Christian Garve. *Kantian Journal*, 39(1), pp. 58-76. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2020-1-3>
- Zimmerman, H., 2012. *Friedrich Gentz: Die Erfindung der Realpolitik*. Paderborn: Schöningh.