Collaborative governance analysis of new rural credit system ba sed on evolutionary game

： Based on the logical framework of collaborative rural credit governance, this paper uses evolutionary game analysis to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of collaborative governance in which grassroots government organizations lead, financial institutions collaborate, and farmers participate, analyzes the strategy choices of the three subjects in rural credit governance, and analyzes and studies the influencing factors of each subject's strategy choices.


Introduction
Rural credit governance is an important part of building a closed loop of China's social credit governance system [1], an endogenous driving force to boost rural revitalization [2], enhance the government's rural governance effectiveness and build an efficient rural governance system [3].China's rural governance is still in its initial stage, the new rural credit rating system has not yet been popularized, and there is still much room to improve the participation behavior of the main bodies involved in rural credit construction.Therefore, this paper analyzes the game between farmers, grassroots government organizations and financial institutions, and studies how to realize the healthy and smooth operation of the rural credit system in more efficiently.
In the analysis of rural credit management, Liu Tao (2017) takes the credit risk of Bank of China Fudeng Village Bank as the entry point, uses game theory to theoretically analyze the moral credit risk it faces and proposes policy recommendations in response to the game results [4].Ni Xu (2018) explored the mechanism of credit risk generation of new agricultural business entities by using game theory analysis [5].Rao Siyuan, Li Zejian, Wang Jiawei (2019) based on the static game model of incomplete information, take the linkage development of inclusive finance and credit system construction in Lankao County as an example,and consider the new path of rural credit system construction under the perspective of inclusive finance [6].The dynamic game analysis is less.

Evolutionary game
A tot Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) basically assumes that all players are finitely rational, incorporates the factors affecting the behavior of players into the analysis framework, and describes how players make strategy choices through continuous learning and imitation in the game process from a dynamic perspective.

Selection of the game subject
The new rural credit system game model includes three subjects: farmers, grassroots government organizations and financial institutions.

2.1.3Basic assumptions and game payoff matrix
Hypothesis 1: With x denoting the probability of positive regulation by grassroots government organizations, y denoting the probability of financial institutions choosing cooperation, and z denoting the probability of farmers choosing participation strategies, "1-x", "1-y", and "1-z " denote the probability of negative regulation, noncooperation, and non-participation, respectively, and x,y,z ∈ [0,1].Hypothesis 2: The behavioral strategies of each evolving game subject are as follows: the behavioral strategy set of grassroots government organization G={G1 active governance, G2 negative governance}, "active governance" means that the grassroots government organization actively collects farmers' credit information for rating, and builds a platform of farmers' credit information data."Passive governance" means that grassroots government organizations do not take active actions, but only passively reward farmers who actively participate in rural credit construction and subsidize financial institutions that support rural credit construction.
Financial institutions' behavior strategy set F={F1 cooperation, F2 non-cooperation}, financial institutions "cooperation" refers to financial institutions actively cooperate with grassroots government organizations, invest certain human and material resources, etc. to jointly build the credit information data platform of farmers, and maintain the update and smooth operation of the credit information platform.Financial institutions "noncooperation" means that they do not participate in the construction of rural credit information data platform, and directly interface with farmers for credit level evaluation and independent credit issuance.
Farmers' behavior strategy set A={A1 Participate, A2 Do not participate}, farmers "participate" refers to actively participate in rural governance and credit governance practices, the process of participation requires a certain amount of time and energy and other costs, participate in the credit index points evaluation, to obtain a good credit rating.Non-participation" means that farmers do not participate in rural credit governance practices, which does not contribute to the improvement of rural governance effectiveness and credit governance effectiveness, and cannot obtain credit points and government rewards.
Hypothesis 3: The assumptions of relevant parameters and their implications in the game model of the evolution of new rural credit system construction.Based on the above assumptions and the parameter settings in Table 2, the payoff matrix of the game between grassroots government organizations, financial institutions and farmers is constructed as shown in Table 3.

Stability analysis of evolutionary games
Bringing the equilibrium point D1 = (0,0,0) into the Jacobi matrix, we can obtain.

Conclusion
The above analysis illustrates that the exact behavioral strategy adopted by each actor in this dynamic system depends critically on the magnitude of the costs involved in choosing that behavior.First of all, from the perspective of the financial institutions, the strategy that affects whether they adopt cooperation to participate in the new rural credit cooperative governance is the cost that they pay when they cooperate.If the benefits of the financial institution's cooperative strategy are greater than the costs, the financial institution is willing to cooperate, the interests of the three game subjects are maximized, and the system evolves to a stable and ideal state; secondly, from the perspective of the grassroots government organization, whether the government actively governs depends on the cost of collecting farmers' credit information and building a credit information sharing platform.Finally, from the farmers' perspective, whether farmers participate or not depends on the size of the rewards and costs of participation by the grassroots government organizations, and farmers will only participate if the rewards they receive are greater than the costs of their time and effort.

Table 1
Tripartite interest needs and behaviors of farmers,

Table 2
Main parameters and their meanings

Table 3
Eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix corresponding to each equilibrium poin