Crisis of institutional trust in society under transformation of social memory values

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Abstract. The paper attempts to identify the connection between the crisis of institutional trust in society, which is formed amidst severe political and social censorship, on the one hand, and the transformation of social memory value in the public mind, on the other hand. Social memory serves as an important construct that incorporates social, cultural, religious, and political norms of the sociocultural past. We suppose that the relationship between social memory and a decrease in the level of institutional trust of society in the legal, social, and political systems is the most important problem and requires empirical and theoretical analysis. At the same time, a number of studies show that social memory serves as an adaptive and balancing factor in the public mind maintaining relative stability in society amidst declining trust in formal government institutions. According to our observations, the ongoing marginalization of public consciousness under these conditions requires additional experimental research, which became the basis of this article. Regarding the social sensitivity of young people to fluctuations in the socio-political system, which is projected in the minds of social memory, we made a survey on the most basic axiological attitudes of the individual. We tried to identify the significance of such constructs as national traditions and customs in everyday life, religion, family, homeland, historical memory, attitude to the past mistakes and merits of the nation. The purpose of our study was to analyze the level of the adaptive resource of social memory, the significance of its meanings in the minds of young people amidst a stable distrust of formal government institutions. The authors have come to the conclusion that the crisis of institutional trust forms a multi-vector process in the mind of the individual: on the one hand, it is subject to such psychological factors as anxiety, short social planning, expectations orientation mainly concerning the inner social circle of people. On the other hand, social memory continues to be a vital resource for maintaining spiritual security in a society that is experiencing the challenges of rewriting familiar meanings in a changing reality.

Keywords: crisis of trust; social memory; adaptation, youth

1 Introduction

The current state of Russian society in general and Chechen society in particular is characterized by such an alarming factor as the crisis of institutional trust in formal government institutions (political, state, legal), which causes social and psychological instability in the public mind. Opinion polls confirm this thesis. According to the Levada Center, the results of a survey on trust in the government institutions in the country, conducted a year ago, indicate an extremely low level of trust in the State Duma being the most democratic institution. In second place there is trust in local authorities. Experts associate the likelihood of this factor with the personnel policy of the “vertical of power” and with the fact that people often play only a nominal role in the formation of this very power [1].

The culture of political trust in the formal government institutions is a process historically and culturally conditioned by the very nature of the relationship between power and society, their mutual influence on each other. The mechanisms of public relations functioning depend on many circumstances; the most important one is political experience in the inclusion of public structures in the management and decision-making processes of formal government institutions.

The weak development of the political culture of society is caused by the low motivation of a significant part to participate in the formation of these branches of power. Such an attitude of the public as “They maintain positions, they know the right way-out” is supported by the social memory of the past, which often plays a constructive role subjectively by strengthening horizontal ties between people in an institutional political crisis, but objectively reduces motivation and weakens the participation skills of public institutions in state governing, which is characteristic of civil society.

Social memory is an adaptive mechanism for maintaining balance and stability amidst crisis changes.
in the social structures of society. It has always been a socializing mechanism for generations’ interaction, continuity in the historical, sociocultural, and religious aspects of the past.

Currently, most institutions of socialization are being subject to autonomy and deformation, which leads to conflicts, loss of ways to interact with each other, correction of their functions. Most of the traditional socialization institutions such as the institutions of the family, the kinship, the system of education and upbringing, labor and work activity, the army, the media, public associations are in crisis associated with both global processes and significant transformations taking place in Russian society. This trend cannot but affects even such a traditional society as the Chechen one.

Several generations of the Chechen Republic youth, whose formation took place at the turn of the history of the country, nation, geopolitical conflicts, socioeconomic reforms and spiritual and moral trials, turned out to be in the context of the indicated processes. A wide range of social polymorphism is observed at the junction of various trends, displacement of cultures and ideologies in modern Chechen society, while the dominant trend is the crisis of institutional trust in formal government institutions. This is a complex socio-psychological and cultural state of society promoting social helplessness and “breakage of the root system”.

From a cultural perspective, trust in political government institutions is exogenous [2]. It is infected outside the political sphere in the deeply rooted consciousness of people, in which the construct “trust” plays a life-supporting role and serves as a condition for the biological survival of the community. Over time, trust is becoming the most important cultural and moral norm and is being transmitted through socialization in the early stages of an individual’s life, adding to the arsenal of traditional culture values.

The arsenal of values of traditional culture is stated in the social memory of people through memories, when in the relevant present a person opens social experience through mental channels saturated with the energy of feelings experienced in the past by the community, its culture, normative etiquette, forms and stereotypes of communications. Despite the deformation of value norms significant for the community in conditions of distrust and crisis in formal institutions of power, social experience can serve as an adaptation mechanism. At the same time, culture cannot be overestimated as a historical social construct capable of protecting society from social deformations. That is, culture cannot be a starting point, a criterion, a judge, an absolute basis for everything that is not culture, but in itself it does not contain its own foundations and justification for its existence (This conclusion was made by Russian religious philosophers after a difficult pass from Marxism to idealism, and then to religious philosophy.“All the achievements of culture are symbolic in nature,” — wrote N. Berdyaev. It does not contain the latest achievements of being, but only its symbolic signs” [3]. Therefore, it was the way of liberation from the numerous idols of the cultural intelligentsia consciousness, and not only in its radical revolutionary form, including the idol of culture. In his well-known article “The Crash of the Idols”, S.L. Frank warned against uncritical faith in the saving function of culture [4]. Nevertheless, social reality fixes that culture, religion, their norms and practices can serve as a condition for maintaining a socio-psychological balance in a period of political crisis being society’s distrust of the governmental institutional system. It provides a social cushion of survival, tolerance and relative stability.

2 Problem Statement

The political culture of the post-Soviet period is characterized by internal conflict and sacralization of the central government and is personified by the institution of the president. The current political culture requires a certain resource and adaptation mechanism from a particular individual and social group, when their role, significance and inclusion in the management mechanism of state institutions of power are minimized.

In order to identify the mechanisms of individual’s adaptation in a crisis of institutional trust, as well as a productive study covering the diversity of worldview dimensions of the young generation of the republic, we conducted in-depth interviews aimed to identify the influence of various cultural and civilizational trends (ethnic, Arab-Muslim, European and Russian cultures) in terms of which there is a value-normative transformation in the minds of the Chechen Republic youth. At the same time, it should be taken into account that modern Chechen society is experiencing a shift in various temporal layers in which traditional and modern development trends coexist. The traditional nature of human interaction is preserved in rural areas in many interaction forms (neighborhood, acquaintance, communication), in the ritual sphere, regardless of the type of settlement (funeral, wedding). Modernization affected the urban population, the service sector, communication standards among the youth.

Simultaneous coexistence of so different trends amidst the active interaction of their actors, on the one hand, introduces transgressive changes in the minds of young people in a crisis of trust in government institutions, on the other hand, keeps social memory a stabilizing factor.

Research Questions

Sociological research was presented in the form of in-depth interviews recorded on a dictaphone. In total, 12 people aged 20–30 were interviewed: 6 girls and 6 boys. The social composition of the respondents was as follows: students, a nurse, a businessman, an employee of an NPO, a builder, an unemployed person, a foreman at a construction site, a seamstress, an unemployed (temporarily), a worker of government structures, etc.

Practical outcome was an analytical report on the study results made by Professor Kurbanova L.U. on December 3, 2019 in Paris.
The survey had the following specificity: the respondents agreed quite willingly to be interviewed, but the conditions for recording on a dictaphone were extremely embarrassing, the reaction varied from a complete refusal to give an interview to asking such questions “Who will listen to this?”, “I would not really like someone to hear my voice”, “Where will it be published?”; “Just don’t ask political questions, I won’t answer,” etc. (Time: October 2019).

**Brief analysis of the study**

During the survey, there were identified several indicators that, in our opinion, could illustrate to what extent the respondents were comfortable/uncomfortable with certain ethnic values, moral, religious attitudes, civic positions, social practices. Among the respondents there were several people who lived outside Chechnya for a long time (Europe and regions of Russia) and came home several years ago. Comparative characteristics of respondents of two social sections (outside Chechnya and inside Chechnya) could serve as a criterion for their rational assessment of their way of life, values and motivations for actions in their ethnic environment, as well as the degree and level of trust/distrust in the institutions of power both in the region and in the country.

**Ethnic identity**

In general, all respondents demonstrated their attitude to their ethnic homeland (Chechnya), to their cultural customs and traditions enthusiastically and patriotically. However, when assessing the possibilities of socio-psychological, legal adaptation in today’s Chechnya, an enthusiastic narrative about cultural roots and historical memory dramatically reduced.

“It’s hard to get a normal job here, even an average job, not necessarily a budget one if there are no protection and powerful acquaintances. I majored in geology and commerce, installation and operation of oil and gas fields. I worked for 1.5 years in my specialty, then problems with payments began, bankruptcy, now I work in fire safety and labor protection on a budgetary basis.” (Lema, 29 years old)

“I was born abroad, in Europe, as my parents went there during the war. I also studied there. When we arrived in Grozny, in Chechnya, it was difficult for me, because I did not know the Chechen language. Yes, it’s easier there (in Europe - interviewer’s note) than it is now in Chechnya. I grew up there and got used to their traditions, to European life.” (Iman, 23 years old)

“... I probably have more grievances towards my homeland, although I can say it is my homeland, but my ancestors lived in a completely different way, but we won’t talk about it, I don’t want to. Now I’ll better answer the question, if you are a Chechen in your passport, then when you leave Chechnya, your state cannot help you in any way, no matter how wrong you are, you have to walk around and be afraid of everything, and when you are in Chechnya, you are not afraid, but you are afraid of the “basic” that a state, which is present here exemplary, well, yes .... the Chechen state will fall on you; I don’t want to talk about it, to be honest, nothing keeps me here, I look at people, I had a friend who was a hairdresser, he left, it is his homeland here ... there’s no point anymore ... when your brain doesn’t relax, it’s automatically called survival. A family man is looking for a place for himself, I’m already approaching this point, to be honest look for another region on the world map being a normal socially developed country. (Islam, 30 years).

“... this life worries me the way it has already developed, I think about how it will be in the future, how the state will affect you, maybe in a bad way, maybe in a good way, you probably understand what I mean. Because it’s hard to live in Russia, economic instability, surviving, fighting off ... social stability, corruption – everyone knows about it but is afraid to say it. Because your family is the most important, everyone thinks that maybe everything will settle down. This is a risk and fear that one day you just won’t come back home, you know that no one will support your family...”. (Khamzat, 30 years old)

At the same time, the respondents quickly change their rhetoric to declaratively patriotic one:

“Chechnya is my home, my Motherland. Here is my family, my relatives. I think I should be here and live with my nation.”

— “... We are Chechens, we have our own adats, our own rules and laws, traditions, we must comply with them. We, as the Chechen people, must show our best side to other nations.” (Iman, 23 years old)

Such a “standard” narrative demonstrating affection for “personal roots” was characteristic of all respondents. Chronologically, in the conversation, the respondents turned to it after or before their critical assessment of the situation in the republic, concerning such areas as the social and legal insecurity of people, the total presence of nepotism in finding a job or study, corruption, etc.

A critical assessment of the situation in the republic, spoken on the record, naturally, had to be accompanied by a demonstration of one’s affection for the republic. Fear of “saying something wrong” to the interviewer, distract, these emotions were not hidden and were the result of a habitual distrust of all government institutions. A negative assessment of the socio-political life of the country and the region was given cautiously, with the reservations “I am not interested in politics”, “I don’t get into political conversations, but what can you do to improve the situation?” “Only, you know, not about power, hell with it!”, etc.

**Religious identity**

The attitude towards religion among a significant part of the interviewees is a kind of social and moral testing. The entire axiological imperative is viewed to the extent through symbolic practice (wearing ritual Muslim clothing, prayer, uraza, alms).

“... I know, despite the fact that we are a subject of the Russian Federation, we are subject to a different
attitude. We wear the hijab, they perceive it differently. For some reason, Russia is still not ready for this. In many schools, organizations protecting the rights of Caucasians, the rights of Muslims are infringed. They are not allowed to pray, to wear the hijab, even when they fast, they can be somehow influenced. I believe that even if we are a subject of the Russian Federation, we are still not perceived the normal way.” (Rose, 27 years old)

Perception of the religion ideology is very superficial. All the respondents clearly traced the idea of the universality of Islam as a religion in the context of moral norms. At the same time, the question that society functioned for a very long time within the framework of adats, outside of Islam, where a person could draw moral foundations, remained without a clear answer. There is a shift in the basic moral practices within the framework of traditional culture (adats) and Islam.

“Actually, we don’t know much about our religion, we don’t study it to the extent we should, but I began to study it more deeply 4 years ago, when I developed, before that I had no concepts, except for the elementary bases...” (Maryam, 27 years old)

But the demand for the moral component of religion is quite high; young people see it as social and legal security in life with the proper religious institutions functioning.

“...For me, religion is the most important. I keep a Ramadan fast every month, I do namaz, I cook something on Thursdays, pies or dishes from national cuisine and distribute them to neighbors, children on the street. I want to develop even more in terms of religion.” (Maryam, 27 years old)

Where do you get knowledge about religion? (question)

“I received a religious education at school. We had a lesson in the history of religion. We first studied our religion there, and then our grandparents, father and mother also taught it to us. You can also find this information on the Internet from reliable sources. (Iman, 23 years old)

- For me, the most important things in a person are their IMAN, Islam, upbringing, doing namaz, keeping a fast. From an early age, my mother taught us, then during the war, when we left for Dagestan, we lived with our uncle. I was 5 years old. They taught me to pray for the first time there. They taught that to make namaz, to fast were the most important things in the life of a Muslim. Make namaz on time. I would initially, introduce our religion to them (children - the interviewer’s note). Because if a person lives according to the Holy Quran, they will follow the right path, this is the most important thing. Yes, I want children to live in their homeland, in terms of religion; I think there would be difficulties. For example, to live among the Russians, because, for example, in Ramadan, many of us fast. If you go out to a non-Muslim city, then it will be difficult for you. (Satsita, 20 years old)

– “We are a subject of the Russian Federation, anyway, our region is more Islamic, that is, in case of any problems, we do not immediately address a court. We go to the muftiate, to the imam, to the elders. We solve problems at the level of our traditions and religion, however, the muftiate cannot always help, the knowledge of the Koran is weak or I do not protect women, I am not sure.” (Maryam, 27 years old)

“Like all Muslims: I read namaz on time, I try to do it, uraza, zakat, Friday service in the mosque. This is like all other things like getting up in the morning, washing, eating, drinking, this is life, like everything else. (Hussein, 28 years old)

At the same time, they noted that religion serves a psychotherapeutic function in their lives.

“If there is no one to talk to, then God is the only opportunity for someone, one should state everything in their thoughts and ask, then some additional hope appears. There is no way without faith, this is peace of mind, you tell yourself that everything will be fine and hear a voice from the outside which tells that you do everything right, it tells you to work, believe that everything will be fine. And there is no other way out, only to rely on .... HIM, prayer gives renewal, peace of mind, helps not to be aggressive at everyone and describe ... (pause...) at this difficult time, give peace of mind, assures that in this life there is something important that you have to give, so that you have such a place, so that your soul finds peace separating from problems, from everything ...” (Islam, 29 years old).

At the same time, the difficulties of institutionalized Islam functioning as a set of moral and legal norms in the republic were noted, the respondent worked in government structures and was better aware of the legal ambiguity of the muftiate’s verdict.

“... It is very difficult for a woman in this regard, she can be refused in many ways. Even I have to address my acquaintances, guys, men who will put in a word for me, I talk myself, I’m sure 70 percent of this will end in failure, and knowing that someone is behind me, the conversation changes in the bud. The attitude is different. I think this is due to the fact that in Islam, the Chechens, in principle, go like the weaker sex, we have to get used to this for another 100 years, that a woman can develop herself.” (Satsita, 24 years old)

The attitude towards their country was expressed in a range from demagogic delight with a primitive accusation of the West, in which it was difficult not to suspect that they told some things because of the conversation being reordered, towards resentment and disappointment with the ruling political institutions, weak social security, and corruption.

“Initially, everything comes from Western influence, but this does not happen inside, because everyone lives normally. Everyone is doing well. Those who struggle, do not do it for a positive purpose, but for a negative one, this leads to consequences, after which some citizens blame Russia itself, although Russia only tries to defend itself and not to lose its dignity.” (Khamzat, 20 years old)

At the same time, respondents selectively relate to the lifestyle of the generalized “West”. Social and legal
security is accepted and welcomed. Democratic freedoms are ready to be accepted in the context of social and legal formal institutions. But within the framework of family and marriage relations, the recognition of alternative models of marriage unions, the intervention of the state in relations between parents and children under the pretext of protecting the rights of the child are categorically not ready to be considered.

Interpersonal communication

Respondents noted the difficulty in interpersonal communication in case not being grow up there. They marked the weak personnel policy in the republic based on demonstrative loyalty to the ruling elite, and not on professionalism. And as a result – a number of social problems: the weakness and low-professional functioning of social institutions, the defenselessness of a particular person in the implementation of their daily needs.

At the same time, the absence of alcohol abuse, the inadmissibility of demonstrating a naked body publicly, the severity of public opinion on the moral side of the relationship between boys and girls were called indicators of a stable public space.

“... Russians, Kazakhs, Tatars, foreigners also visit our republic; they can dress as they want. The only thing we ask men is not to wear shorts, because it is considered wrong in our republic, ugly. And as for girls, they come in trousers, without sleeves, without headscarves, no one tells them anything; this is a free country, region, religion. We just ask them for that minimum, and then we will never take them to the police or chase out of the building, we will just come up and explain. If a person does not have suitable clothing, any Chechen will consider it an honor to give him or her appropriate clothing or help to find a way. For some reason, we are not fully accepted in Russia as its region. Moreover, many people express their dissatisfaction with the fact that a lot of money is being invested in the Chechen Republic, that we should not revive so quickly, that we have become insolent.” (Iman, 24 years old)

The respondents pointed out the attractiveness of the republic for migrants not only in the labor market, but also in the way of life of Chechen society: lack of alcohol abuse, modesty in dress, respect for old age and parents.

“... A lot of visitors are looking for a job here; many understand that the conditions here are good. They simply understand that they will be treated well. You will not meet a drunk person here not only not lying somewhere, but also not walking and staggering, you will not see this. This is actually a very important factor, although 15 years ago we had this; many Russians who have created a young family want their children to grow up in a decent society where everyone is decently dressed and behaves decently. I know many families who have moved here, not only to convert to Islam, they probably do not want this, but to grow culturally. All the same, whatever we are, we adhere to certain orders and frameworks.” (Maryam, 28 years old)

At the same time, respondents marked the safety of the urban environment compared to other regions:

“We have a beautiful, clean city. Safe.... There are no drunks, drug addicts, you can calmly walk down the street in the evening and not think that someone will get out of the corner and harm you. Here it is severely suppressed. Of course, there are cases, but in comparison, what happens outside. People leave houses, cars open here... Have you seen anything like this anywhere? Outside the republic, people buy car alarms, including me, cameras and alarms in entrances and apartments. They do not sell alcohol here, there are no nightclubs. All food is Halal.” (Rose, 28 years old)

Trauma of war

We are forced to admit, Freud noted, that no event has been so destructive to so many universal human values as war [5]. In support of this thesis of a well-known psychoanalyst, we present fragmentary statements of young people about the trauma of the war in their fate, that is, the significance of the military events themselves or memories of them. The war served as a watershed in their life “before” and “after”. These are such “internal catastrophes”, as Roy Ayerman wrote, leaving wounds and scars in the memory that are not easy to erase and which are unpredictably reflected in the behavior of the individual in the future [6]. The story about the war or its consequences is based on a narrative, colored with emotions of pain, fatality, defenselessness, bewilderment, etc., the rejection of war as an act of thoughtless, illogical, sometimes irrational violence on both sides. In all the cases reported, the trauma referred to a real event, a physical or emotional blow that stroke all the senses and against which the mind and body did not manage to defend.

“... Of course, I understood what was happening, but I didn’t understand the reason why it was happening. I thought that the war was a complete absurdity. Those who start it from the beginning will never die in it. The instigators will not die. They sit at home and give orders. Ordinary people suffer, ordinary workers who do not deserve it. For me, this is complete absurdity. Probably, based on this, I always dreamed of becoming a human rights activist. So, I went to law school. I dreamed of protecting people, I thought I could do anything to limit that negativity (laughs). But gradually I realized that in this country it was very difficult to protect someone, it was very difficult to call for a law, a constitution. Rather, it was not a woman’s business, especially in our republic. (Maryam, 28 years old)

You understood what was happening, did not know the reason why it was happening, what was wrong. But did you know who was fighting? (question).

“To be honest, I don’t think so. Who exactly fought, they fought and ordinary people suffered. I believe that someone wanted to infringe on someone’s rights. As a result, these two sides started a war. A huge fire was lit, in which ordinary people suffered, who had been satisfied with everyday life, their income. As a result, such a revolution took place ....”
“No, because there is no bad nation, but there are bad representatives of the nation. There were a lot of Russians who hid from the Chechens, from other Russians. Who helped, who didn’t want them to suffer. When surfing some forums on the Internet, you encounter Russian men who then served in Chechnya, who almost cry remembering this situation, how our people suffered. Because they saw those ordinary people who did not know what to do with themselves, those who didn’t know how to get money on food. Every nation has both bad and good representatives. I don’t think you should condemn your nation.”

Do you tell your sons about the war? Do you try to explain to them who it was, what it was? Maybe they have questions.

“No I myself can’t understand who fought there, there are so many people who defected; I have never delved into this, into this politics. I don’t know what to explain to them, I try to explain to them what is right and what is wrong, I have daughters. Those fought on that side, those for the other; in any case they had some hidden motives. There were people who directly entered some of those circles themselves, and then realized that it was not so much a question of interests and rights, but rather just ordinary politics, the usual seizure of power. Soon they simply left that circle, went to another country, that is, they realized that it was not worth shedding blood for that, that it was wrong, and left. There were such people, and I do not believe that any of these parties was right, just everyone defended the point of view that he considered correct. And in fact, they did not suffer any damage. I can’t go on (laughs).” (Maryam, 28 years old)

“Before the first company in the Czech Republic, my parents worked in state organizations. After moving during the war, there was no work, nothing ... We were children, we do not remember what our parents did to maintain the family. After moving to Kazakhstan, everything was very difficult. My father got a job at a construction site at first, my mother baked various things - bakery products, national stuff, on request, semi-finished products... well, such things, while we were at school in Kazakhstan, catching up with the school curriculum, while we were not studying in school in the Czech Republic. (Hussein, 28 years old)

“I would wish the youth an easy life, and not the one that our mothers and fathers experienced. No war. Because it was a very terrible time. The Chechens had a very hard life.” (Satsita, 24)

“I was not at school during the first war in 1994, we were in the village with my grandmother. 1.5 years passed there, then the war ended, sort of ended (in quotation marks). Then in 1999 I was in the 3rd grade then, I remember that day when we were released from school. My mother and I, my father then worked in the north, he did not come, he was on duty, and we went to the village to my grandmother, from there we went to Ingushetia to my mother’s relatives. We lived there for two months and left for the north. It was the end of 1999, December. It was the first time I went by train, it has remained in my memory. Then we arrived, and went to school there, we didn’t have any documents, but they helped us, the administration met our needs, they accepted our word concerning the grades we studied in. These were me, my brother and sister. We were given all the books, and I started going to school and everything was fine. We were fed at school free of charge.

That day we were given permission to leave school, everyone was already standing in the yard and ready to leave, because it was not known when and how they would bomb.” (Lema, 29 years old)

We deliberately asked some questions in detail. The subjective view of a particular young person on a series of events, facts, values confirms the thesis about the identification of a person as an actor and verbalizer of a specific social position. In this process, it is difficult to grasp the sequence in which a particular individual and society changes. Do the mechanisms of social practices and values change and shift in the process of communication of individuals, or do changes occur in social small groups, gradually projecting these changes onto wider social strata? Or is the change of value paradigms going on in parallel: personality – group – society?

In our study, the sociometric scales of in-depth interviews dealt with such important indicators of young people’s lives as their attitude to their ethnic culture, historical past, to the memory of their ancestors, problems of tolerance, authorities, trust in legal institutions, love for the city, the republic, the degree of religiosity and the role of faith in the daily life of the respondents.

3 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to find out how social memory in the form of socio-cultural values in the youth environment could serve as an adaptation resource in a crisis of institutional trust.

To achieve this goal, we set the following tasks:

1. To find out the value priorities and guidelines of the modern youth of Chechnya through an in-depth interview.

2. To trace the social origins of the obvious marginalization of some of the youth, which undoubtedly affects the structure and essence of the value narratives they articulate.

3. To identify through interviews to what extent and in what spheres of life, young people can sincerely and frankly talk about their plans, are able to assess the social, cultural and legal life of the region.

4. To analyze the resource possibility of social memory being a valuable socio-cultural construct, an adaptation mechanism in a crisis of institutional trust in power.

4 Research Methods

Complex social processes imply the need to take into account the entire basic set of methodological paradigms of micro and macrosociology [7]. At the same time, the researcher is in a difficult position amidst the absence of a clear dominance of any theoretical approach that
allows exploring the life of people filled with contradictions. On the one hand, social reality is loaded with the problems of the material world, on the other hand, the topics of the “transcendental”, spiritual processes being difficult to measure within the framework of empirical scales and indicators are actualized in it with gathering force [8].

It is clear that the system of an individual, a social group, like any other system experiencing stresses and economic tremors becomes more complicated. Its elements (values, meanings, socio-cultural norms and preferences) become more complex and change. At the same time, in our explanatory models, we continue to use the framework of traditional normative practices, values, cultural stereotypes formed as social memory. When these processes are superimposed in a specific social reality, we find that they “do not fight with each other”, there is a failure both in the minds of an individual and society in understanding the assessment of specific modern social processes.

At the same time, it should be born in mind that institutional trust is a very flexible construct, which changes under the influence of heterogeneous and diverse social processes [2]. Transitional societies experience the range of these transformations most strongly, when stable and situational, objective and subjective, external and internal factors of fluctuations in the institute of trust of the subject act with equal force.

We suppose that the theoretical framework of the sociocultural approach can be the methodological basis of our research tasks, and this conclusion is substantiated by the following considerations.

Integrativity is one of the methodological characteristics of the sociocultural approach. A key process (phenomenon) is selected, whose change contributes to altering sociocultural field including spheres of people’s lives. Values can be the “integral”, the core of socio-cultural life [9, 10], “holistic social phenomena” [11], everyday beliefs, “ideal culture” as a holistic way of life, collective memory [12]. These concepts are defined as “integrative” phenomena of social life and are studied simultaneously at all “deep levels”, in their generic types and various relationships [13]. In our case, the key process is the crisis of society’s institutional trust, which is explicitly or latently spoken by the respondents during in-depth interviews. At the same time, sociocultural values (morality, faith, family) serve as adaptation mechanisms for the individual and the community as a whole. At the same time, society and culture themselves are not the last foundations that set the meaning and mode of existence for everything else, but they themselves need such foundations (2009). They do not lower the degree of anxiety and uncertainty in society because, according to F. Fukuyama, trust is the expectation arising among members of the community that its other members will behave more or less predictably, honestly and with attention to the needs of others, in agreement with some general norms [14].

The results of a sociological study suggest that the respondents often know the norms and values of ethnic culture formally, but are able to articulate them clearly. At the same time, values are not an internal motivation for some young people, but certain sacred meanings transmitted by their ancestors. Lebon believed that the fate of a nation is controlled to a much greater extent by dead generations than by living ones [15]. Knowledge of adat is superficial, there is a constant shift in Islamic values articulated in the form of ritual practices, but not legal or value ideology.

Obviously, for the younger generation, religion is a moral imperative, its non-acceptance is impossible by definition. Such a high importance of religion in the fate of Chechen society can be considered based on the thesis that religiosity here is a factor in social and moral testing and, as a result, it determines the status of an individual in a family, group, public space. In the taxonomic levels of identity, religiosity is a key factor, surpassing national identity.

Respondents clearly position themselves as ethnic Chechens; they observe the norms and practices in intra-ethnic communication. At the same time, norms and values are transferred into intercultural communication rather weakly. Note: the institution of public opinion within the Chechen society is still high, but the core assessing deviation of the behavioral practices of a particular individual is shifted inside the ethnic community (recognizing oneself as an LGBT person or an unbeliever is unthinkable within an ethnic community, and leaving for Syria, framed as a kind of religious idea (when leaving 5 children without a livelihood, plus the pressure of the political and legal machine on the relatives of the deceased), does not cause such condemnation.

A tolerant attitude towards the “Other” is the next basic characteristic in adats, but this awareness is poorly traced by the respondents in specific actions. The declarative recognition of tolerance is recognized as a norm in national traditions. (“Of course, you need to be patient with people of a different religion and culture.”) At the same time, Western values are treated selectively: the instrumental part of the life of a Western person is perceived, the value part in the sphere of family and marriage relations is rejected). That is, the assessment indicator is the scale of values of personal culture, while the essential foundations of personal culture are not known well.

Respondents have weakly expressed social criteria of adat norms in the context of the interaction of the idea of recognizing “The other is a part of you”.

In the background, throughout the interviews, one can trace wariness, fear, distrust of the legal, state and political institutions. Verbally, the respondents often expressed their distrust of the institutional system latently, in the form of expressions “Well, do you understand what is it with us?”; “Yes, who is interested in us and our problems?”.

5 Findings

6 Conclusion
When analyzing the results of a sociological study, the authors came to the conclusion that the crisis of institutional trust in political, state and legal institutions in the Chechen society, on the one hand, was accompanied by such psychological factors as anxiety, short social planning of life strategies, orientation in social expectations only for the closest social circle of people (relatives and friends). On the other hand, social memory continued to be an adaptive resource in the tactical and strategic life dimension of society, being a condition for sociocultural survival, a mechanism for preserving the moral environment.

At the same time, under such conditions, a significant layer of marginalized youth is formed: they do not have clear, verified values of traditional customs and traditions, there are no valuable religious foundations, they do not find themselves in the "elitist environment" of power structures, they are extremely poorly educated.

It is also important to keep in mind that despite the key factor in the problem of the crisis of trust in power, it should not be considered either as something self-sufficient, or as the only instance that sets meaning and content for all aspects of society.

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