A game-theoretical model of multisubject industrial policy

¹ Institute of Economics of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Yekaterinburg, Russia
² Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg, Russia

^* Corresponding author: alex.ponomareva@gmail.com

Abstract

The vector of industrial policy developmen aimed at the transition from the domination of the state to the involvement in its development of all stakeholders is relevant in developed countries. Such an approach requires an additional scientific justification, confirming its feasibility. The purpose and objectives of the paper is the development within the framework of game theory a model of relationships of subjects interested in the industrial policy based on their interests, strategies, areas of conflict and areas of consensus. The study used a multi-subject approach, which implies the existence of a number of independent stakeholders with their own goals and strategies. The methodology of evolutionary game theory (EGT) was used to analyze the interests of the stakeholders of their coincidences and conflicts. The process of formation of industrial policy identified three possible points of equilibrium. The interaction between the state and enterprises is formalized as a game in a normal form, the functions of utility of the players and the equation of replication dynamics are presented. To formalize the problem and finding the equations of the replicative dynamics, we have considered the problem in a general form for the continuous asymmetric games. In terms of content, the results and decisions can be used as a characteristic of the space for the creation of multiple mutually acceptable agreements between real and potential participants in the process of industrial policy formation. It is possible to further analyze the model to obtain a quantitative assessment of the factors that have the greatest impact on the motivation of the interaction participants.