Kant on free thinking and its boundaries

Moscow Aviation Institute (National Research University), Department of Philosophy, 4 Volokolamskoe shosse, 125993 Moscow, Russia

^* Corresponding author: ivanovmikhailh@gmail.com

Abstract

The concept of “free thinking” in the context of Kant’s philosophy presents a theoretical and practical problem. Kant applies the concept of freedom primarily to practical reason and moral philosophy, but elements of freedom (in thinking) can be identified in other sections of his teaching. Free thinking, according to Kant, can be interpreted as thinking activity conducted in the absence of any prerequisites, utmost unboundedness and independence, but having definite boundaries in various areas. The analysis of this ambivalence of free thinking is carried out in such sections of Kant’s teaching as theoretical knowledge, the area of everyday thinking, the social field and the work of artistic genius. One of the tendencies revealed as a result of this analysis is Kant’s desire to postulate the unconditionality of the freedom of thought in different areas, and then to formulate minimum constraints on it. Thus, while proclaiming unlimited freedom “to use his mind and speak on his own behalf” in the social sphere, Kant admits only two restrictive principles: the requirement of scientific knowledge and the presence of goodwill. The most important component of free thinking in the teachings of Kant is the principle of sapere aude, which acts as the trigger-mechanism and the foundation of free thinking, as well as the evidence for its sociality and non-mechanistic nature. Research shows that, through the concept of free thinking, Kant implicitly formulates the ideal of free thinking, which manifests historical continuation and has lasting value.