Origins of morality. Kant and modern cognitive science

Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Philosophy, GSP-1, Leninskie Gory, 119991 Moscow, Russia

^* Corresponding author: natvalen@list.ru

Abstract

The origins of morality, the role of emotions in moral behaviour and other related issues nowadays agitate philosophers as well as natural and cognitive scientists. They investigate the seemingly ‘moral’ and ‘reasonable’ behaviour of social animals, which raises the question of the nature of morality in a new perspective, and thus motivates an appeal to Kant’s moral philosophy. It is noteworthy that Kant did not connect morality exclusively with human nature. Linking moral principles with pure reason, he considered morality as an a priori condition of the moral behaviour of every rational being. In this article, I attempt to compare Kant’s moral rationalism to the ethical doctrine of enactivism. I would suggest that, despite obvious differences, these concepts are quite compatible as indicated by the empirical data of modern life sciences. The result of the combination of these conceptions can be a hybrid position based on the recognition of the necessary character of morality, due to the reasonable structure of the world. In the first section, I consider the Kantian rational interpretation of morality. The second section provides an outline of the enactivist approach. The third part focuses on the contribution that modern natural science can make to the analysis of moral behaviour. In conclusion, I recap major findings and reiterate my position.