Environmental accounting information disclosure from the perspective of game theory

RCF Experimental School, 100101 Beijing, China

^* Corresponding author: yangliuxin@rdfzcygj.cn

Abstract

In reality, environmental accounting information disclosure still faces a series of issues, such as information asymmetry and lack of transparency. This results in discrepancies in the information held by both buyers and sellers. The party with information advantage may conceal their known information as a means of profit, while the other party takes various actions to obtain information to avoid losses. This article primarily introduces the background of environmental accounting information disclosure and its importance in market operations and management. It then analyses the motives behind accounting games and the potential dynamics of decision-making processes in non-cooperative relationships and conflicts of interest. In the study, qualitative research methods were mainly employed, including literature reviews, specific case studies, and mathematical measurements. Additionally, data on environmental accounting information disclosure from typical publicly listed companies were collected to construct a model of the bargaining relationship and consider its depth quantitatively. The research results indicate that in accounting games, the factors influencing the bargaining of both parties are not singular but are affected by various situations and conditions. Because of the divergent interests pursued by both parties, the intended outcomes of environmental accounting information disclosure, such as information symmetry and transparency, are compromised. Based on these findings, this article presents some optimization suggestions and actionable plans to prevent publicly listed companies from exploiting policy loopholes and to encourage them to more actively fulfill their obligations in disclosing accounting information, thus improving the stability of the domestic market.