The concept of violence in the philosophy of Aristotle

Belgorod State National Research University, 308015, Belgorod, Russia

^* Corresponding author: rimskiy@bsu.edu.ru

Abstract

The idea that the concept of 'violence' was part and is still viewed as part of a broad philosophical category may seem strange. However, the problem is resolved by referring to the concept of 'force,' which is lost in modern philosophy. The exception was the works in which we find some “traces” of this concept, including the works of Aristotle, which need to be free from modernizing interpretations. Still, in the translations of Aristotle, the Greek word δύναμις, used in its traditional meaning of potentiality, lost its connotations of force (movement, capability, function); in turn, 'force' was no longer linked with 'violence' (βια) and 'necessity.' Violence is seen as a kind of necessity, which is associated with the suppression of 'will,' freedom, something 'frustrating desire' and contrary to 'common sense,' as well as the absence of 'good.' Violence is presented not only in an ontological sense, but also existentially, as the opposite of 'good' and one's own 'desire.' Force stays in the background of 'necessity' as 'potentiality', 'potential energy' and 'movement', and violence loses the opposition that has arisen in the ontological mode.