Game theory: Central government should regulate the development of dual-nuclei cities

School of Management and Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen Campus), Shenzhen, Guangdong, 518172, China

^* Corresponding author: 123020063@link.cuhk.edu.cn

Abstract

The dual-nuclei structure, which means two considerable cities in one region, is typical in urban agglomerations. However, relevant studies have long lacked exploration of the game relationship between the two cities. Studies about dual-nuclei structure from game theory may offer some suggest the healthy development of dual-nuclei regions. This article will focus on building simplified models of dual-nuclei structure by using Guangzhou-Shenzhen’s relevant data in decades. In the study, cities are divided into two types, which are the center city and the port city. By using game trees to explore the fitness relationship of dual-nuclei cities, the study has found that the overall benefit is not always optimal when the dual-nuclei cities’ relationship reaches Nash equilibrium. It came out that cities tend to compete for their own benefit though it is harmful to the overall interests of the region in trading areas. It may approach the optimal benefit in the education area, but there still exists the risk of vicious competition. Therefore, governments need to regulate the differential development of dual-nuclei cities by adopting different economic and educational policies for different cities.