Study on risk control of visa-free policy based on game theory

¹ University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 7ZX, Britain
² Shanghai DianJi University, Shanghai, 200240, China
³ France Jilin University, Changchun, 130012, China

^* Corresponding author: Chenhe.Liu21@student.xjtlu.edu.cn

Abstract

In recent years, the Chinese government continues to expand 24/72/144 hours visa-free policy applicable country places, many foreign tourists to take this opportunity to visit features of landscape in China. However, there are some illegal elements among the foreign tourists who “hang sheep’s heads and sell dog meat” in an attempt to seek illegal profits in the Chinese territory through means such as “three non”. In view of this series of illegal behaviours, the bilateral game model is used to study the impact of changes in parameters such as the amount of fine and the verification cost of public security organs on the proportion of foreign tourists who have “three non” (illegal entry, illegal residence and illegal work). The results show that increasing the fine amount and reducing the premium of the inspection cost of public security organs can effectively reduce the proportion of foreign tourists with “three non” problems. On this basis, this paper proposes to formulate reasonable fine standards, develop an information system for the exit and entry management of foreigners shared by the public security throughout the country by the central government, and open the public feedback channel, which can effectively solve the “three non” problems.