Open Access
| Issue |
SHS Web Conf.
Volume 157, 2023
2022 International Conference on Educational Science and Social Culture (ESSC 2022)
|
|
|---|---|---|
| Article Number | 02005 | |
| Number of page(s) | 4 | |
| Section | Distance Education Training and Educational Innovation | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202315702005 | |
| Published online | 13 February 2023 | |
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