Open Access
Issue
SHS Web Conf.
Volume 190, 2024
2024 International Conference on Educational Development and Social Sciences (EDSS 2024)
Article Number 03031
Number of page(s) 7
Section Intelligent Technology Development and Talent Cultivation
DOI https://doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202419003031
Published online 18 April 2024
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