Antitrust Regulation of Self-Preferential Behavior of Digital Platform Operators in China

King’s College London, London, UK

lruoyao712@gmail.com

Abstract

In the past two decades, the platform economy has been developing rapidly, and while creating great welfare for the society, it is easier to form a monopoly pattern due to its multilateral nature, price asymmetry and economy of scale. Some digital platforms with a dominant market position have implemented self-preferential behaviors based on their dual roles as market organizers and market operators, disrupting the order of free competition, making it necessary to impose antitrust regulation on them. This paper analyzes the current status of antitrust regulation of self-preferential behavior of digital platforms in China and finds that it is still in its infancy, and there are dilemmas such as deficiencies in the relevant market definition methods, the existing types of abuse of dominant position of market dominance not being able to cover all selfpreferential behaviors, and the lack of experience in and high difficulty of law enforcement. In response to these difficulties, China can improve the relevant market definition methods, add new types of abuse of dominant market position, and introduce the settlement mechanism to improve the antitrust regulation of selfpreferential behaviors of digital platform operators, and ultimately promote the healthy and prosperous development of the platform economy.